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The analysis and understanding of the background of consumer choices get more and more attention 
nowadays. A significant amount of consumer choices are traceable as one of those inter-temporal 
decisions of the individual that are made at different times. To map the decision-making process, it is 
necessary to introduce inter-temporal choice models and to show the characteristic features that are the 
most relevant for decision making. The discounted utility model shows the temporal features of 
decision-making, the characteristics of which are the positive time-preference and the time-consistent 
discount rate. Since the discounted utility model – in numerous cases – did not prove the 
characteristics of the decisions of everyday life, new models were created to describe these procedures: 
these are the hyperbolic and quasi-hyperbolic models. With their help it is possible to explain the 
main features of temporal decisions. The parameters, which show a distortion towards the present and 
are inconsistent in time, make it possible to explain some human behaviours that were not previously 
understandable. One of these behaviours is when one extends their present consumption with the help 
of a loan. Regarding the fact that a consumer loan can be considered to be an inter-temporal choice, it 
has become justifiable to compare the results of behavioural science in this field with the legislation 
covering consumer loans. In this study we are going to make an attempt at this comparison while also 
looking for an answer to the question of whether the results of inter-temporal choice models appear in 
operative legislation or not. If they do, we would like to see whether they are seriously taken into 
consideration or not. Furthermore, we would like to know what possibilities need to be considered by 
the legislature, law enforcement bodies and all others present in this complex field. 
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The analysis and understanding of the psychological background of consumer 
choices – a type of behaviour – was considered important even in neoclassical 
economics.  Adam Smith was the first to deal with the topic, while further analysis 
showed that the background of consumer choice has a significant influence on the 
consumer’s emotions and evaluation related to time. People associate different future 
times with typically underestimated preferences. This relationship clearly defines an 
individual’s decision made in the present but influencing his or her future.  
In connection with the examination of the topic mentioned in the title of this 
study, we have started with the following economic assumption: money is 
considered a general factor of production. At the centre of our study, we analyse 
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the consumer choices that make it possible to gain the above mentioned factor of 
production, in other words we examine consumer choices in connection with loans. 
In the case of a loan, the most important factor is its temporality, ergo an inter-
temporal choice in connection to money.  
The starting point of our study could be the description of a homo oeconomicus, an 
individual – driven by needs and necessities – who aims to consume as soon as 
possible, in the present or in the near future. The wish to fully satisfy their needs 
and necessities soon can easily lead to choices in which the importance of 
consumption in the present becomes so great that the individual will enlarge that at 
the expense of his or her future consumption. In this way, the individual restricts 
some future possibilities while trying to get a certain amount of money – an 
abstract utility factor – which he or she does not have in the present. Actually, this 
is what happens in the case of asking for a loan – which according to its aim – is 
also the extension of some future consumption. One brings forward their present 
consumption at the expense of future consumption, in other words, exchanges 
their future (possible future consumption) for the present (present excess 
consumption) (Andor, 2012). However, these decisions can have severe risks that 
cannot always be seen beforehand. That is why it is justifiable to analyse the factors 
that influence the background of these choices.  
The issue presented in the first paragraphs of this study – in a much simpler 
version – was first modelled by Fischer in 1930. He said that inter-temporal choices 
– the comparison of the present utility factor of different times – depend on the 
marginal rate of substitution related to time. The marginal rate of substitution is 
defined by time preference and decreasing marginal utility. A significant 
breakthrough in this field was Discounted Utility (DU) theory created by Samuelson 
(1937). Discounted Utility theory spread fast and was really popular primarily 
because of its simplicity. The other reason for its popularity was that it managed to 
involve all the psychological factors that influence our choices in one parameter, 
which is the discount rate (Bölcskei, 2009). Samuelson collected all the 
heterogeneous and diverse factors of choice in one discount rate and considered it 
a constant. This way different utilities appearing at different times became easily 
comparable. According to Samuelson: “at any time an individual behaves so as to 
maximize the discounted sum of all future utilities.[...]An individual discounts future utilities in a 
simple and consequent way, which method is known for us.”(Samuelson, 1937) So a positive 
temporal discounted unit has to be connected to the theory, which means that a 
distant temporal point will have smaller utility, and, thus, this will strengthen 
consumption closer to the present. DU theory considers the discount factor in an 
exponential way, so the utility rate – related to the present and the one related to 
the future – will also change in a constant way. We can assume that a constant 
discount rate and time-consistent preference is a typical characteristic of discounted 
utility theory.   
Numerous experiments done in the field of behavioural economics deny DU 
theory, since the respondents to the problems did not make their decisions in 
harmony with the model (Neszveda and Dezső, 2012). As a result, it is evident that the 
behaviour of the respondents could be much better described with other 
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discounted models. The experiments and researches resulted in the hyperbolic and 
quasi-hyperbolic models that describe preferences distorted towards the present.  
The phenomena described by hyperbolic models was first analysed during 
animal testing. The animals preferred a smaller but immediate award to a larger one 
that they would have received later. The model was created right after the 
evaluation of the experiment, while the discount rate showing time preference was 
drawn in the form of a hyperbola. The model was altered more times. Finally, it was 
Loewenstein and Prelec who in 1992 created general hyperbolic discounting, with the 
help of which it was possible to handle some earlier anomalies as well as a 
description of human behaviour. However, it was difficult to apply their model in 
more complex cases. It was the quasi-hyperbolic discount model that became 
popular within a relatively short period of time (Neszveda and Dezső, 2012). It 
describes an inconsistent behaviour in time – similar to the hyperbolic discount 
model – however, the model is much simpler and easier to handle.  
The idea of quasi-hyperbolic discounting comes from Phelps and Pollak. It is 
inconsistent in time and assigns a bigger discount rate to short-term time 
preference. The time preference of the distant future can be consistent in time, but 
its distortion towards the present is significant. The β parameter was involved in the 
model as a further discounting factor compared to the only (constant) discount rate 
of DU theory. If we compare the form of hyperbolic function to that of the 
exponential one, in the case of hyperbolic function the consumption utility close to 
the present can significantly lean towards the pole – depending on the value of the 
β parameter. The long-term time preference will become straighter and straighter 
across time, so the discount rate decreasing in time is typical only in the period 
closer to the present (distortion towards the present), then the discount rate 
becomes consistent in time (Nagy, 2011). 
We must mention here that the two different discounted models have different 
results regarding the distant future, but in this study we are not going to deal with 
this aspect.  
The significance of the hyperbolic and the quasi-hyperbolic models is the 
following: with their help it became possible to explain and describe human 
behaviours that had not seemed sensible earlier (Bölcskei, 2009). Due to preferences 
distorted towards the present, present consumption utility is more important than 
possible future consumption utility. However, if future consumption is postponed 
to a later date, it will decrease in utility not exponentially but by a larger amount. 
That is why any individual in this case will try to maximize his or her consumption 
– or in other words, his or her utility – as much as possible, regardless of the 
present financial possibilities. Let us not forget that the exchange of the present to 
the future works the other way round too: an individual can reach an excess of 
consumption in the present by asking for a loan. In this case, we talk about the 
results of an inconsistent time-preference distorted towards the present. 
Consumers’ time-inconsistent behaviour is not a novelty in the field of bank 
loans. Banks offer numerous banking products that are based exactly on this type 
of time preference distorted towards the present (Sebestyén et al., 2011). The credit 
delivery system can easily lead (and has already led) to consumer loans, where the 
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debtor asked for a loan – because of his or her time-inconsistent time preference 
and some over-optimistic estimation regarding his or her future financial situation – 
and finally he or she was not able to pay the instalments. The realization of this 
type of credit delivery system was the result of the information ascendancy of 
financial institutions. Instead of ascendancy perhaps we had better use the term: 
information asymmetry. In the case of banking products and services, the vendor 
of the product or service – the bank – has significantly more information than the 
buyer (the future debtor).  
An important question comes up here: does the operative legislation take into 
consideration the circumstances and characteristics of the individual’s inter-




1. The contract is defined in the Civil Code by Section 6:58 of Act V from 2013  as 
the following: „The contract is a mutual and unanimous disclaimer of the parties 
according to which obligation arises for performing the service, as well as 
entitlement arises for demanding the service.” The New Civil Code – in harmony 
with Act IV from 1959 in the (Old) Civil Code remained in force until the 14th of 
March 2014 – primarily ensures the principle of freedom of contract. According to 
this principle, the subjects of private law can enter into a contractual relationship as 
they wish. The legal standards relating to contracts are mainly dispositive 
provisions, from which the parties may differ by mutual consent. The parties can 
agree on the subject and the details of the contract. Contractual obligations can be 
defined by law only in exceptional cases. In private law, equality and juxtaposed 
relationships are presupposed and ensured by main principles. Any intervention in a 
private law relationship is guaranteed by law for the case only when the legal or 
contractual balance between the parties is upset because of an information deficit 
or the lack of necessary professional information. In these cases legislation has the 
presumption that in order to re-establish the contractual balance, the weaker party 
has to be supported legally. A typical instance for intervention into a private law 
relationship – by legislative provisions with mandatory content – is the contractual 
relationships on General Terms and Conditions and Consumer contracts. 
2. Most consumer credit contracts are signed using General Terms and Conditions, 
so it would be logical to examine these legal parameters now. According to 
paragraph (1) Section 6:77 of the New Civil Code: „General Terms and Conditions 
are the conditions of a contract, the details of which were defined unilaterally in 
advance by one party, without the participation of the other party, in order to be 
applied on more contracts”. The general Terms and Conditions will become valid 
only if the applier of the contract makes it possible for the other party to read the 
content of the contract before signing it. The other condition is that the other party 
has to accept the conditions of the contract. The New Civil Code prescribes the 
obligation to inform the other party in connection with the acceptance of the 
conditions. Another important regulation is that in the case when the General 
Terms and Conditions differ from any other condition of the contract, the latter 
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will be in force1. In practice it generally means that if the consumer signs a shorter 
version of the contract – which refers to the General Terms and Conditions – and 
there is a contradiction between the contract and the General Terms and 
Conditions, the shorter version will be in force, and the parts that are in 
contradiction will not be part of the contract.  
As we have already mentioned, the justification of the mandatory provisions 
regulating contractual freedom derives from the fact that in certain cases the 
balance between the contractual parties shifts or is upset. This situation makes it 
justifiable to protect the rights of the weaker party. It is typical in the case of the 
application of General Terms and Conditions, since one party – unilaterally, 
without the cooperation of the other half – defines the conditions of the contract. 
As a result, an obligation or condition can become part of the contract, which can 
evidently be disadvantageous for one party. A good example for this is the right of 
financial institutions to modify contracts unilaterally. According to the Civil Code2 
it is not a violation of law if a financial institution declares its right – in the General 
Terms and Conditions – to modify contracts unilaterally. In this case, this new 
condition becomes part of the contract. It is evident that here the consumer’s 
contractual position weakens by great measure, since there is the possibility to apply 
a term in the General Terms and Conditions which will provide the possibility for 
the bank to modify the contract unilaterally and, at the same time, will exclude the 
right of the court to alter or modify the contract. 
The Act CCXXXVII of 2013 on Credit Institutions and Financial Businesses 
acknowledges the right of financial institutions to unilaterally modify their consumer 
credit agreements, however, at the same time it partly restricts that right – in order to 
protect consumer rights – by saying that it is possible to modify only interest, costs 
and fees. According to the Supreme Court, the financial institutions’ right to 
modify interest, costs and fees is rational, as it serves both parties’ interests3.  
3. The defenceless state – deriving from the nature of the legal relationship – made 
it necessary to provide legal protection for consumers who suffer from unfair 
General Terms and Conditions in contracts. 
A condition of a contract is considered unfair when the applier of the contract 
defines the obligations and rights – unilaterally and wantonly – by violating the 
requirement of good faith and righteousness on the expense of the other party4. To 
                                                     
Section 6:80 on New Civil Code.  
True to both the Old and the New Civil Code.  
 2/2012. (XII.10.) PK opinion: „The legal possibility to modify rates, interests and 
fees has the benefits for both contractual parties. The right to modify the contract 
unilaterally makes it possible – in the case of a long-run contract – to keep the 
contractual balance that was set at the time of contracting. Its aim is to reduce the 
risks deriving from calculations of a long-term contractual relationship. It protects 
the consumer by guaranteeing that the financial institution shall not devolve the 
calculated rate of rising costs to the consumer and will not offer a more expensive 
loan because of these calculated costs.” 
4Paragraph (1) Section 6:102 New Civil Code.  
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regard a contractual condition unfair, every aspect that led to signing the contract 
has to be examined. The function of the service, as well as the contracting parties’ 
relationship to other contracts and other conditions in the same contract, has to be 
examined. With regard to these aspects, one has to refer to the relevant chapter5 of 
Act CCXXXVII of 2013 on Credit Institutions and Financial Businesses – referring 
to the defence of clients. These regulations include how to inform clients properly 
and declare special regulations related to contracts.  
We must emphasise that the regulations that refer to unfair General Terms and 
Conditions cannot be applied for contract conditions that define the main service 
or the rate of service and remuneration, if those are clear and understandable. 
Furthermore, according to the New Civil Code, the General Terms and Conditions 
are not considered unfair if those are defined by law or if those are drafted 
according to standard legislation.   
 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INTER-TEMPORAL DECISIONS 
AND LEGISLATION 
 
If we compare the results of behavioural science in connection with inter-temporal 
decisions and the legislation that we have summarized in the 2nd chapter – without 
attempting to be comprehensive –, we can assume the following correspondence.  
The case of legislative intervention – to violate or break the principle of 
contractual freedom of private law – is acceptable in the case of models describing 
preferences distorted towards the present. In these cases a consumer can get into a 
situation – because of inconsistent time preference, his or her over-confidence and 
over-optimistic estimation regarding his or her future – when the contractual balance 
shifts at his or her expense. The reasoning for this regulation basically refers to 
information asymmetry: it is typical in a situation where the contractual balance – 
deriving from the equal position of the parties – is upset because of the lack of 
important pieces of relevant information. That is why legislation provided the right to 
legally intervene in contractual relationships. A strong distortion towards the present 
and the decrease of time-inconsistent utility will become really significant at this 
point, since these are typical characteristic features of any inter-temporal decision and 
quasi-hyperbolic model. The circumstances, that the consumer makes a decision in a 
state of time-distorted utility decrease, will definitely influence the chance for an 
objective consideration. In the hope of maximising his or her present excess 
consumption, the individual will tend to disregard the negative effects on his or her 
decreasing consumption possibilities. We think that the characteristics of the quasi-
hyperbolic model will have a double effect in this case. On the one hand, the 
disadvantageous situation, with its information asymmetry, will seem „desirable” for 
the consumer. On the other hand, because of the same reasons, the consumer is not 
able to evaluate the effects of the information asymmetry in a sensible way and will be 
inclined to neglect the negative effects of the shift of the contractual balance.  
In the case of choices regarding consumer credit agreements based on the inter-
temporal and the quasi-hyperbolic models, we have revealed and analysed their 
                                                     
5Chapter XIII. Act on Credit Institutions and Financial Businesses. 
Regional and Business Studies Vol 7 No 1 
 15 
negative aspects on consumers at two points. The most important thing is that we 
have compared them to the relevant law in force. The behaviour deriving from the 
temporality of the decision places the situation – which leads to asymmetric 
information and shift of balance – in better light than it is in reality; on the other 
hand, the chance to take the negative effects into consideration is greatly reduced. 
As far as we are concerned, we would say that it is evident that the possession of all 
the relevant information, combined with professional knowledge and experience, 
would normally counterbalance a decision-making process generated by a distorted 
time-preference. Since this latter factor is evidently subjective, there is much less 
chance to make a rational decision based on objective pieces of information. We 
must add here that the contractual balance will be further shifted if the financial 
institutions offer banking products which exploit this time-preference distortion 
towards the present. 
If we think about it further, we must ask a question: if time-preference distorted 
towards the present has such a strong correlation with information asymmetry, like 
we have shown above, then where is the borderline of legal intervention? How 
much freedom does legislation have in this field? To what extent can legislation 
intervene in a situation in order to ensure the contractual balance in the long run – 
and in a calculable way? By answering these questions we have to emphasise that 
the only aim of legislation is to guarantee contractual balance and to define the 
measure of legal intervention in private law cases.  
We can also state that by regulating the general terms and conditions, consumer 
rights and the unfair general terms and conditions of contracts, the legislative system 
has created a new legal situation. Parts of this regulation can be applied in order to re-
establish the contractual balance of inter-temporal consumer decisions. The most 
important aspect here is the obligation of a financial institution to give proper and 
relevant information to consumers. However, giving proper information may have 
the result of decreasing the disadvantages of inter-temporal decisions – not of 
hindering them. The obligation to give proper information can be especially relevant 
when one party proposes the invalidation of a contract by referring to its unfair state. 
Every aspect that led to signing the contract has to be examined in this case. 
Theoretically, it can occur that a financial institution offers a banking credit 
product to a consumer and applies a time-preference distorted towards the present 
on purpose. In this case the consumer can attack the contract because of an 
intentional error of the financial institution. It means that the bank intentionally 
avoids giving relevant information or provides wrong data to the consumer. 
We must underline here that our findings cannot lead to procedures which are 
greatly limited because of taking the characteristics of inter-temporal decisions into 
consideration. In the case of making an economic decision, reason and the objective 
ranking of risks are basic phenomena. However, because of the experiences of the 
last couple of years – especially the case of those who have foreign-currency credits – 
it is advisable to take into consideration every aspect that can lead to system-level 
risks. In our view, risk-management can be divided into three fields: providing the 
necessary and justifiable legislation, offering objective and relevant information to 
consumers and the legal application of relevant information.  
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We must also mention that the low level of deposit interest rate6 offered by the 
credit institutions at present, combined with the rate of taxation7 on interest 
income, further strengthen the distortion towards the present. 
The results of behavioural science in connection with the inter-temporal decisions 
when applying for a consumer credit – especially those of the quasi-hyperbolic model 
– meet the requirements of the principals of private law contracts. We have found 
that the behaviour regarding the temporality of the decision when applying for a 
consumer credit on the one hand supports, and on the other hand strengthens, the 
shift of contractual balance. In order to re-establish the contractual balance, we have 
collected the possible fields of intervention and their limits as well. By applying these 
actions consequently, we hope to minimize the risks of these types of financial 
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6 1.000.000.- HUFfor 6 months, in the case of an unconditioned deposit EBKM 
(Annual Interest Rate): 0,65 % - 2,9 %, according to the mean of 24 banks the 
Annual Interest Rate is: 1,95 %  http://www.bankracio.hu/betetkalkulator/lekotott-
betet/feltetelek-nelkul?deviza=17 
7Act CXVII of 1995 on personal income tax; according to the regulations 16% tax 
rate has to be paid on the interest of deposits rate. Besides tax rate, since January 1st 
2013, a 6% health care contribution has to be paid according to Act LXVI of 1998. 
Total tax after interest income is 22 %.  
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